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We can advance our philosophical understanding of textual interpretation by 
following Davidson’s lead away from the question ‘do author’s intentions 
matter?’ to the question ‘which of the author’s intentions matter?’ When we do 
so, we discover that however difficult it is to discern the intentions of authors 
in textual interpretation, it is clear that certain kinds of authorial intentions 
figure in any textual interpretation. In the interest of moving beyond the 
intentional fallacy, in Section One I examine George Dickie and W. Kent 
Wilson’s objections to E. D. Hirsch’s view that we guess the intentions of 
authors.1 Dickie and Wilson argue that we determine authorial intention by 
inference, not guesswork.2 Guessing, Dickie and Wilson argue, would never 
suffice to provide the knowledge of intentions that Hirsch’s position requires. 
Furthermore, they charge Hirsch with an infinite regress of intentions in 
interpreting the utterances of others. In Section Two, I argue that Dickie and 
Wilson’s arguments against Hirsch’s view that we guess at the intentions of 
utterers are short-sighted, insofar as I show that the criticisms they make of 
Hirsch’s view apply equally to their own view of inferring intentions. I also 
argue that Dickie and Wilson face the same infinite regress of intentions with 
which they charge Hirsch. In Section Three, I briefly consider Roland Barthes’ 
death of the author thesis as an influential extreme example of the view that 
authorial intentions are entirely irrelevant to interpretation.3 I argue that Steven 
Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels’ critique of the possibility of intentionless 
texts can be directly applied to Barthes’ view.4 In Section Four, I note that 
contributors to the debate concerning the intentional fallacy often fail to make 
explicit which authorial intentions they think are or are not relevant to 
interpreting texts. Drawing from Donald Davidson’s work, I provide a sketch 
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of three kinds of intentions that are relevant in interpretation.5 I illustrate some 
of Davidson’s points through a discussion of an exchange between Robert 
Morris and Davidson concerning Morris’s use of Davidson’s textual utterances 
in a series of blind drawings Morris did in the 1990s.6 Their exchange serves as 
a good example of how we can progress beyond the debate about the 
intentional fallacy to a deeper understanding of which intentions are relevant to 
interpretation.  
 
Hirsch’s Guesses & Dickie and Wilson’s Inferences 
Hirsch is a strong intentionalist, by which I mean that he thinks an author’s 
intentions concerning the meaning of his or her text determine the meaning of 
the text. According to Hirsch, interpreting a text hinges on knowing the 
author’s intentions, which means knowing what the author’s intentions 
probably are. There are milder forms of intentionalism that are probably much 
more tenable than Hirsch’s for a number of reasons.7 However, Dickie and 
Wilson’s criticism of Hirsch’s account of how we arrive at knowledge of the 
intentions of authors is illuminating as we think about how to move beyond the 
debate about the intentional fallacy.  
According to Hirsch, to know the meaning of a sequence of words, we 
have to know what the author intended by the words.8 At the same time, he 
readily acknowledges that we do not have direct access to the intentions of 
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others.9 Hirsch claims that we determine the author’s intentions by guessing 
what they are. He says:  
It is perfectly true that the complex process of construing a text 
always involves interpretive guesses as well as the testing of those 
guesses against the text and against any relevant information the 
interpreter might know... But the process and psychology of 
understanding are not reducible to a systematic structure (despite the 
many attempts to do so), because there is no way of compelling a 
right guess by means of rules and principles. Every interpretation 
begins and ends as a guess, and no one has ever devised a method for 
making intelligent guesses.10 
Hirsch thinks that the goal of interpretation is validation of one’s interpretation 
and conclusions, rather than verification. According to Hirsch, a verified 
interpretation implies “direct confirmation and certainty,” which involves 
demonstrating “that a conclusion is true.”11 Validation, on the other hand, aims 
at consensus in interpretation among those in the audience and commits one to 
showing only that on the basis of evidence, the interpretation is probably 
correct. We arrive at the best interpretation of a text in part by making guesses 
about what an author’s intentions probably are in saying this or that.  
Dickie and Wilson identify several problems with Hirsch’s view that we 
guess at the intentions of others. First, Dickie and Wilson do not think that we 
guess the intentions of others. Instead, they claim that we infer the intentions of 
others. They also argue that Hirsch’s guesswork falls short of providing 
knowledge of intentions. Finally, Dickie and Wilson claim that Hirsch’s view 
of guessing intentions faces an infinite regress of speaker intentions. Dickie 
and Wilson argue that Hirsch’s view flies in the face of common inference-
making practices. They claim that “what is commonly thought” about 
knowledge of the intentions of utterers is that as a rule, we do not guess the 
intentions of others, but rather, we infer the intentions of others on the basis of 
evidence.12 Furthermore, to infer intentions about utterances, we must first 
understand what the utterances mean. The meaning of the words as they are 
combined is an essential part of the evidence that the interpreter uses to infer 
intentions of utterers. According to Dickie and Wilson, the only times we guess 
about the intentions of others are when we are confused by the evidence13  
For Dickie and Wilson, what a speaker might mean by an utterance 
cannot change what a speaker has said. Consider the following example from 
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Dickie and Wilson, which brings out the difference between speaker meaning 
and utterance meaning.14 Antoine and Brennan are eating soup together when 
Antoine notices a fly in Brennan’s soup. Antoine says to Brennan, “there is a 
filé in your soup,” when what he intended to say is “there is a fly in your soup.” 
The speaker meaning is that Antoine had intended to warn Brennan that there 
is a fly in his soup. Even if Antoine corrects himself and says “I meant to say 
that there is a fly in your soup,” or if Brennan looks down and sees the fly in 
his soup, then realizes what Brennan had intended to say, what does not change 
is that Antoine told Brennan that there is a thickener called filé in his soup. The 
utterance meaning of “there is a filé in your soup” is determined by what is 
public and available, whereas the speaker meaning seems to be at least in part 
determined by the speaker’s intentions. Hirsch’s view of interpretation says 
that for Brennan to understand Antoine’s utterance he must know what Antoine 
intended, and since he has no direct access to Antoine’s intentions, he must 
guess at what they were. According to Dickie and Wilson,  
This [Hirsch’s view of guessing intentions of others] would be no 
problem if Brennan could guess correctly what Antoine’s intention is 
and know that he has guessed correctly. But how is this to be done? 
The way in which it is commonly thought that someone finds out 
what a speaker’s intention is is by understanding the speaker’s 
utterance and inferring the speaker’s intention.15  
Dickie and Wilson give no argument for “what is commonly thought” in their 
text, nor do they cite any evidence about how we discover utterers’ intentions. 
They also find it troublesome that Hirsch seems to be committed to the claim 
that we guess at the intentions of others independently of understanding the 
meaning of utterances, since according to Dickie and Wilson, for Hirsch the 
utterance cannot be determinate in meaning until the interpreter is aware of the 
utterer’s intention. Dickie and Wilson claim that the usual way of interpreting 
the utterances of others is that “[w]e infer on the basis of evidence what others’ 
intentions are … an essential part of the evidence is typically the understanding 
of what the utterances mean.”16 In other words, on the usual view, Antoine 
utters “There is filé in your soup” and Brennan, who knows the meanings of 
the words and that there is filé in his soup, expresses irritation with Antoine for 
stating the obvious. According to Dickie and Wilson, Brennan has incorrectly 
inferred Antoine’s intentions, but has correctly interpreted what the utterance 
meant.17 Dickie and Wilson claim that Brennan has interpreted Antoine in the 
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usual way, which consists of understanding the meanings of the words and then 
inferring the speaker’s intentions (wrongly, as it happens, in the case of 
Brennan’s inference regarding Antoine’s intentions). However, Hirsch’s view, 
according to Dickie and Wilson, is that we cannot understand an utterance 
independent of knowing the utterer’s intention, which we guess. According to 
Dickie and Wilson it is unclear how we can know the utterer’s intention 
independent of the utterance and in such a way that the guessed intention 
counts as knowing the intention of the utterer.  
Dickie and Wilson also argue that Hirsch’s view of guessing at an 
author’s intentions suffers from an infinite regress. In so arguing, they explain 
how Colin Lyas also charges Hirsch with an infinite regress of intentions.18 
According to Lyas, Hirsch claims that every word sequence is indeterminate in 
meaning and the author’s intentions give word sequences determinacy. In fact, 
though, Hirsch says that “[s]ometimes a use of language is uniquely 
constitutive of meaning” as in, for instance, some cases of translating 
utterances concerning technical matters from one language to another.19 What 
Hirsch actually argues is that most uses of language are not uniquely 
constitutive of meaning, but that what makes them determinate are the utterer’s 
intentions. Even still, Lyas’s charge of an infinite regress, if coherent, would 
apply to the word sequences that Hirsch would regard as indeterminate in 
meaning. The basis of Lyas’s infinite regress charge is that “it is a condition of 
having an intention that some set of words should bear a certain meaning and 
that one be able to represent that intended meaning to oneself.”20 In other 
words, as Dickie and Wilson point out, Lyas assumes that we can represent 
linguistically all of our intentions to ourselves, which, as we shall see shortly, 
makes for a spurious assumption.21  
Lyas’s infinite regress argument focuses on a speaker’s linguistic 
representation of intended meaning to himself or herself rather than on how 
one interprets utterances of speakers. In the Antoine and Brennan example, and 
according to Hirsch, “There is filé in your soup” does not mean that Antoine 
intends to warn Brennan that there is filé in his soup, because Antoine intends 
to warn Brennan that there is a fly in his soup. By “There is filé in your soup” 
Antoine intends and represents to himself linguistically “There is a fly in your 
soup.” Upon seeing Brennan’s irritation, Antoine realizes that Brennan has not 
understood Antoine’s intended meaning. Antoine cannot convey his intention 
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to Brennan by simply repeating his utterance, since Brennan did not understand 
Antoine correctly in the first place. Antoine can utter some elucidatory 
statement such as “I meant to say that there is an insect in your soup.” 
However, according to Lyas, since Hirsch is committed to the view that word 
sequences are indeterminate without intentions, Hirsch has to be committed to 
Antoine’s having an additional intention that he can represent to himself 
linguistically that gives the elucidatory set of words the meaning that Antoine 
intends them to have. If every word sequence is indeterminate in meaning 
without intentions, as Hirsch argues, then the linguistic representation of the 
additional intention that gives the elucidatory statement meaning must have yet 
another intention, which Antoine can also represent linguistically, ad infinitum.  
Dickie and Wilson think that Lyas’s argument may work against Hirsch 
insofar as Lyas’s infinite regress is directed at Hirsch’s claims concerning 
interpreting literature. According to Dickie and Wilson, it is reasonable to say 
that the intentions authors have concerning what they write are linguistic. But 
Dickie and Wilson also say that it is possible that the intention behind the first-
order intention (“There is a fly in Brennan’s soup”) is non-linguistic.22 
According to Dickie and Wilson, it is unclear whether Hirsch thinks that 
intentions can be non-linguistic. If Hirsch does think that intentions can be 
non-linguistic, then we can pull the brakes on Lyas’s alleged regress with the 
first non-linguistic intention. The difficulty is that Hirsch does not argue that 
intentions can be non-linguistic nor does Lyas argue for his claim that 
intentions must be linguistic. Consequently, Dickie and Wilson say while that 
Hirsch’s view does suffer from a problem of infinite regress, Lyas’s argument 
is “inconclusive.”23  
Dickie and Wilson argue that on Hirsch’s account, when Antoine says “I 
intended to say that there is an insect in your soup,” Hirsch is committed to the 
view that Brennan could only understand Antoine’s original expression if he 
knows Antoine’s intention in saying “I intended to say that there is an insect in 
your soup.” However, as we have seen, Dickie and Wilson argue that Hirsch 
provides no way in which Brennan could know Antoine’s intention. They say: 
On Hirsch’s theory, hearers do not have a general, effective way of 
discovering speaker’s intentions, and consequently, cannot 
understand the bulk of the utterances they hear. 
It is worth pointing out that guessing, even guessing correctly, is not the same 
as knowing, and philosophers have been at pains to distinguish the two. As 
long as hearers are guessing what a speaker intends, they do not know what she 
or he intends. Thus, on Hirsch’s view, hearers could rarely, if ever, know, i.e., 
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understand what is said.24 Since Hirsch thinks we guess at the intentions of 
others as we do not have direct access to intentions, Dickie and Wilson claim 
we cannot know the intentions of others and hence, Hirsch’s view is really that 
we can never understand the majority of utterances.  
Dickie and Wilson also argue that Hirsch faces an infinite regress in a 
slightly different way from the regress Lyas describes when we consider not 
how speakers give their utterances meaning, but rather how interpreters 
understand a speaker’s meaning. In the Antoine and Brennan example, if we 
suppose that Antoine is a Hirschean intentionalist, he will take himself to be 
assisting Brennan when he asserts an elucidatory statement such as “I intended 
to say that there is an insect in your soup.” Brennan will then need to guess 
Antoine’s intention in uttering the elucidatory statement. However, Brennan 
cannot know Antoine’s intention in either the first utterance, “There is filé in 
your soup” or the second, “I intended to say there is an insect in your soup,” 
because Brennan can never be sure that his guesses are correct concerning 
Antoine’s intentions. Antoine could continue to express his intentions 
indefinitely and Brennan would never be the wiser as to Antoine’s meaning, as 
Brennan would always need to know the intention that lay behind Antoine’s 
most recent expressed intention. However, since Hirsch has it that we guess at 
the intentions of others, rather than know the intentions of others, Brennan 
cannot know Antoine’s intentions. Consequently, Brennan has an infinite 
regress of intentions that lie behind his first utterance, namely “There is filé in 
your soup,” and Antoine is unable to understand either the first or subsequent 
statements by Brennan because he cannot know Brennan’s intentions. The 
most Brennan can do, if Hirsch is right, is go on guessing at Antoine’s 
intentions indefinitely.25 Thus, as Lyas argues, Hirsch’s view contains an 
epistemic regress.26  
 
Guessing, Inferring, Living with a Regress 
In arguing that they do not think we guess at the intentions of others, but rather, 
that we infer the intentions of others on the basis of what they have said, 
Dickie and Wilson do not explain in any detail the difference between inferring 
and guessing, and neither does Hirsch. It is unclear whether Dickie and Wilson 
are really talking about something different than Hirsch with their talk of 
inferring intentions. Dickie and Wilson claim that as a rule, we infer the 
intentions of speakers on the basis of evidence and that much of the evidence is 
the meanings of the words uttered. Hence, it would seem they are assuming 
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that the distinction between their inferences and Hirsch’s guesses refers to a 
distinction between supported inferences, based on evidence, and unsupported 
guesses. Dickie and Wilson also think that by Hirsch’s account, we guess at the 
intentions of others without understanding what the relevant utterances mean.  
In fact, though, Hirsch’s guesses look very much like Dickie and 
Wilson’s supported inferences and Hirsch is not committed to the view that we 
guess at the intentions of others without interpreting their utterances. Hirsch 
claims we have to “test” our guesses against the text and against any relevant 
information we have about a speaker or author.27 Additionally, Hirsch admits 
that we can construct multiple possible interpretations of utterances and such 
possibilities are precisely what make interpretation indeterminate without the 
speaker’s intentions. Hirsch’s problem is that we cannot rest on a determinate 
interpretation without knowing the intentions of the speaker or author.28 We do 
guess at the intentions of the speaker or author, according to Hirsch, but we do 
not do so independent of the words uttered. We guess at the intentions of the 
speaker or author based on the words uttered and any relevant external 
information (e.g., biographical information about the author’s state of mind we 
may have) or internal information (e.g., the context of the utterance, the words 
chosen, etc.) we may have about utterers. Since Dickie and Wilson maintain 
that we infer the intentions of others in large part on the basis of understanding 
what the words uttered mean, they are in agreement with Hirsch, at the very 
least, in that the words uttered constitute some of the evidence supporting 
purported intentions of utterers.  
As Hirsch says, there is no science of guessing the intentions of others.29 
All we can do is the best that we can in inferring the intentions of others on the 
basis of the evidence. Hirsch also says: 
… the wit of man is always devising new guesses, and his curiosity 
is always discovering new relevant information. A validation is 
achieved only with respect to known hypotheses and known facts: as 
soon as new relevant facts and/or guesses appear, the old conclusions 
may have to be abandoned in favor of new ones. In order to avoid 
giving the false impression that there is anything permanent about an 
interpretive validation or the consensus it aims to achieve, I now 
prefer the term “validation” to the more definitive-sounding word 
“verification.” To verify is to show that a conclusion is true; to 
validate is to show that a conclusion is probably true on the basis of 
what is known. From the nature of the case, the goal of interpretation 
as a discipline must be the modest one of achieving validations so 
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defined. But it also follows from the nature of the case that 
interpretation is implicitly a progressive discipline. Its new 
conclusions, based on greater knowledge, are more probable than the 
previous conclusions it has rejected.30  
Hirsch claims that we validate an interpretation of a text by showing that the 
information we have of the speaker or author is relevant to the interpretation of 
the words. In addition, the task of interpreting is on-going. Due to the “wit” 
and “curiosity” of human beings, when we find that someone has said 
something interesting, we continue to try to interpret it on the basis of new 
guesses concerning the intention of the speaker or author. These new guesses 
are based on new information that is considered relevant to interpretation.  
Dickie and Wilson do not develop their account of how we infer 
intentions in detail, but it has to be similar to the way Hirsch claims we guess 
intentions. For Dickie and Wilson, we infer the intentions of others on the basis 
of evidence and for Hirsch, we guess at the intentions of others on the basis of 
evidence. And while Dickie and Wilson do say that an essential part of the 
evidence in inferring a speaker’s intention is understanding the speaker’s 
words, they do not say that understanding the speaker’s words is always 
sufficient for inferring the speaker’s intentions. In inferring the intentions of 
utterers, we do of course need to attend to the meanings of their words and 
understand those meanings. However, we also attend to the context in which 
the words are spoken or written, the tone of voice, and what we know of the 
speaker.  
Hirsch’s choice of the word “guess” is unfortunate. However, he clearly 
argues that when we guess at the intentions of others, our guesses are educated 
guesses, not wild guesses. Furthermore, Hirsch is correct in claiming that there 
is no science of making intelligent guesses even on the basis of evidence about 
the intentions of others. So Dickie and Wilson’s demand that Hirsch must 
provide an account of how we can know what another intends is too high a bar 
to set, unless they simply mean that Hirsch must provide an account of how we 
can justify our guesses about the intentions of others. If they mean the latter, 
Hirsch provides such an account and it is virtually indistinguishable from the 
very brief account that Dickie and Wilson supply concerning inferred 
intentions.  
Dickie and Wilson are of course correct in saying “that guessing, even 
guessing correctly, is not the same as knowing, and philosophers have been at 
pains to distinguish the two. As long as hearers are guessing what a speaker 
intends, they do not know what she or he intends.”31 However, it is unclear 
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whether for Dickie and Wilson, inferring yields knowledge. If Dickie and 
Wilson mean that we can arrive at knowledge on the basis of inference, then 
Hirsch provides as much (if not more) of an account of knowing the intentions 
of speakers as Dickie and Wilson do, since the latter’s inferences look very 
much like Hirsch’s guesses. Consequently, we ‘know’ speakers’ intentions in 
the same way according to both Hirsch’s and Dickie and Wilson’s account.  
To return to Hirsch’s regress, Dickie and Wilson argue that it consists of 
the fact that one must have an intention in saying x, which the hearer or reader 
must guess, then another intention in any elucidatory statement y about x, then 
another intention in an additional elucidatory statement, z about y, and so on ad 
infinitum. However, if, as I have argued, Hirsch’s guesses concerning the 
intentions of others are indistinguishable in any important way from Dickie and 
Wilson’s inferences regarding the intentions of others, then we can ask first, 
whether Hirsch actually faces a regress, and second, if he does face a regress, 
whether Dickie and Wilson face the same one.  
First, I do think that strictly speaking, Hirsch faces an infinite regress. 
According to his view one can never be sure if one has correctly guessed the 
intentions of another. Thus, the spoken or written utterance remains 
indeterminate in meaning in an absolute way, as do any elucidatory statements 
about the original utterance under interpretation. However, as we have seen, 
Hirsch does not think that we can know in any final way the intentions of 
others. Instead, he thinks we must be content with what the intentions of others 
probably are, given the evidence. Second, barring a more complete account 
from Dickie and Wilson of just what sort of knowledge inferred intentions 
constitute in the context of spoken utterances, Dickie and Wilson face the same 
regress Hirsch does. Inferred intentions are always probable intentions. 
Brennan cannot ever know with certainty what Antoine meant by “There is filé 
in your soup” or any subsequent the elucidatory statement. Brennan may infer 
intentions for as long as he likes and Antoine may offer as many elucidatory 
statements as he likes. Still, whether Brennan uses the word ‘guess’ or ‘infer’ 
to describe his interpretive attempts, Brennan can never be sure that he knows, 
in some absolute sense, what Antoine intended to say.  
While I believe Dickie and Wilson face the same regress as Hirsch, I do 
not think that the regress constitutes a refutation of either of their views. 
Intentions are often evasive things, speaking metaphorically, even in our own 
cases. Dickie, Wilson, and Hirsch all agree that conclusions about inferred 
intentions are probable at best. First, in many interpretive contexts, spoken and 
written, we are very good at ascertaining what someone intends to say, even if 
we are not infallible. In addition, it is often immediately apparent when we do 
not grasp what someone has intended to say or meant by his or her words 
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because of the replies we get in response to our interpretations. For instance, I 
recently dropped off a letter of nomination for a student award at an office on 
my campus. Unclear whether I had missed the deadline, I asked the man in the 
office if I could still submit my nomination. He said “yes, you can, because we 
haven’t met.” Puzzled by his response, I said “what would happen if we had 
met before?” A woman in the room started laughing into her desk while the 
man informed me that he had intended me to understand his utterance to mean 
that the award committee had not yet met to discuss the nominees, not that he 
was trying to say he and I meeting previously would have affected my 
submission of the nomination. My exchange with the man in the office is not 
the norm. As a rule, we correctly understand what others intend to say and they 
correctly understand what we intend to say. Second, even if we are not always 
correct in grasping what someone intends to say, if we do have non-linguistic 
intentions, then as Dickie and Wilson claim for Lyas’s charge of a regress, the 
regress ends by appealing to the first non-linguistic intention.  
In the case of the written text, an author does not usually have the luxury 
of immediately responding to how his or her text is interpreted. There is a 
greater distance between author and interpreter than there is between speaker 
and interpreter. Often, the author has in fact died and cannot respond to 
interpretations of his or her work. However, in noting that the distance tends to 
be greater, we ought not to use the extreme case of distance, such as 
anonymous writings, as the norm. It is not uncommon for authors to respond to 
interpretations of their texts. Authors do so respond because they assume that 
among the continuities between interpreting the spoken and the written word is 
the relevance of intention in grasping what is meant by the author’s or 
speaker’s particular combination of words. Authors can also respond to 
interpretations of their texts by improving subsequent editions or versions by 
tightening or clarifying the sentences therein to reduce the range of possible 
interpretations.  
 
The Death of the Author and Intentionless Texts 
As Socrates explains, texts have a “strange quality”32 about them which makes 
them like paintings.  
[Paintings] ... stand before us quite as though they were alive; but if 
you question them, they maintain a solemn silence. So, too, with 
written words: you might think they spoke as though they made 
sense, but if you ask them anything about what they are saying, if 
you wish an explanation, they go on telling you the same thing, over 
                                               
32 Plato, Phaedrus, trans. W.C. Helmbold and W.G. Rabinowitz, (New York: Macmillan 
Publishing Company, 1988), lines 275d-e.  
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and over forever. Once a thing is put into writing, it rolls about all 
over the place, falling into the hands of those who have no concern 
with it just as easily as under the notice of those who comprehend; it 
has no notion of whom to address or whom to avoid. And when it is 
ill-treated or abused as illegitimate, it always needs its father to help 
it, being quite unable to protect itself.33  
It is impossible to control into whose hands the written word falls or what the 
reader will do with the written work and, what the written word says now it 
says forever. In the absence of the author, the text cannot answer for itself and 
has no defence or reply to the confused, abusive, or critical reader. Ignoring 
responses from authors concerning their intentions not only belies common 
sense practices concerning interpretation, it also leaves us with interpretations 
that are more impoverished than they need to be. For instance, it is for good 
reason that scholars debate the authenticity of the Thirteen Epistles attributed 
to Plato.34 There is much at the level of interpretive enrichment at stake in that 
debate. If Plato is the author of those epistles, particularly of the Second and 
Seventh Epistles, then we find ourselves with valuable insight into Sicilian 
history and Plato’s life and character. The epistles also contribute greatly to our 
understanding of Plato’s later thought, especially the philosophical digression 
in the Seventh Epistle, which helps to round out our explanation of how his 
thought evolved concerning the relationship between the limits of linguistic 
meaning and epistemology. That we can never know exactly an author’s or 
speaker’s intentions does not detract from the important role that intentions 
play in interpretation. Attention to responses from authors concerning what 
they intended to say in their texts can help to narrow the possible range of 
interpretations of a text. However, encouraging such attention is at odds with 
Barthes’ influential claim that the author dies when he or she commences to 
write, to which I now turn.  
According to Barthes, the critic and reader alike are foolhardy to seek 
the right interpretation of the text in the one who produced it, because the 
performing in a written work is not the performance of the author, but that of 
language. A written text is a series of performative utterances that refer only to 
practices within language itself.35 As with other performatives, the statements 
in the text are not truth-functional and are meaningful only in the “very 
practice of the symbol itself.”36 For Barthes, the assumption that authorial 
                                               
33 Plato, Phaedrus, lines 275d-e.  
34 See, for example, R. Hackforth, The Authorship of the Platonic Epistles (Manchester: 
University of Manchester, 1913); and Plato, Letters VII and VIII, ed. and trans. R. S. Bluck 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1947).  
35 Barthes, ‘Death’, p. 145. 
36 Barthes, ‘Death’, p. 142.  
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intentions could contribute to textual interpretation is based on the assumption 
that in writing, an author acts transitively on the world through the textual 
utterances. However, according to Barthes, when one writes, one acts not 
transitively, but instead, intransitively with words, and there is nothing outside 
of the action to point to in explaining it. By his account, the text is a question, 
not a description or an account. On this view, the intentions and convictions of 
the author are irrelevant, because there are no authors. Instead, there are 
scripters, who do not express the author’s deepest sentiments, thoughts, or 
passions, but instead, leave only the “pure gesture of inscription.”37  
Barthes says that “the modern scripter is born simultaneously with the 
text, is in no way equipped with a being preceding or exceeding the writing, is 
not the subject with the book as predicate; there is no other time than that of 
the enunciation and every text is eternally written here and now.”38 If there is 
no intending subject who stands as author, the text is an instance of 
intentionless meaning. In discussing the notion of intentionless meaning, 
Knapp and Michaels do not have Barthes’ death of the author in mind. 
However, I think their arguments are applicable to Barthes’ view. Knapp and 
Michaels argue that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a 
case of intentionless meaning. In one example they offer we are to imagine 
walking on a beach and finding marks in the sand.39 When we step away from 
the marks, we see these words:  
A slumber did my spirit seal; 
I had no human fears: 
She seemed a thing that could not feel 
The touch of earthly years. 
Initially, we might believe that since we understand what the words mean 
without knowing the author’s intentions, the intentions of the author are 
irrelevant and we have just experienced a case of intentionless meaning. We 
could go as far as Barthes and say that not only are the intentions of the author 
irrelevant, the author dies in the act of writing, and all we have are inscriptions. 
However, next we imagine that the tide comes in, washes away the words, and 
when it goes out again, leaves these words:  
No motion has she now, no force; 
She neither hears nor sees, 
Rolled round in earth’s diurnal course 
With rocks, and stones, and trees. 
                                               
37 Barthes, ‘Death’, p. 146.  
38 Barthes, ‘Death’, p. 145.  
39 Knapp and Michaels, ‘Impossibility’, pp. 54-56.  
Beyond the Intentional Fallacy 
 
Literature & Aesthetics 20 (2) December 2010, page 69 
Now we will be surprised and imagine that the sea is alive or that Wordsworth 
himself, somehow, writes through the sea. In other words, we will be aware of 
attempts to attribute the words to an intentional being. Furthermore, upon 
reflection, we will realize that when we read the first stanza, we had tacitly 
assumed an author, and not that the writings in the sand were accidental or that 
the intentions of the author were irrelevant. Since we are now trying to unravel 
the mystery of how the sea could be alive or how Wordsworth could inhabit 
and write through the sea, we realize we have replaced an assumption that a 
wanderer on the beach inscribed the words with possibilities of what seem to 
be supernatural intentional agents. If we were not to try to ascertain who the 
intending author could be, we might surmise that the marks in the sand are 
“nonintentional effects of mechanical processes” such as erosion.40 But if we 
were to assume that erosion explains the marks, Knapp and Michaels argue, we 
would not see the marks as words and instead, we would say that they resemble 
words. The marks would seem like an amazing accident, but not language, and 
certainly not poetry. As soon as we see the marks as language, as soon as we 
see inscriptions as language, we assume an intentional agent or we try to 
discover the intentional agent who could be responsible for the text in the sand. 
If an inscription is linguistically meaningful, then there is an intending author, 
even if we cannot ascertain who the author is. 
 
Relevant Authorial Intentions 
Barthes argues, or rather he seems to assume, that statements in a text are 
meaningful in the “practice of the symbol itself.” However, he does not seem 
to appreciate that by his account, at least one kind of authorial intent is thereby 
relevant to the interpretation of texts, namely the intention to utter statements 
whose meaning can be explained by pointing to those linguistic practices. 
Davidson’s account of some of the kinds of intentions present in language use 
that are relevant to interpretation brings this point out. Consequently, I turn 
next to a sketch of the three kinds of intentions we must attribute to speakers 
and authors in interpreting symbols as meaningful words.  
Both Beardsley and Davidson admit that participants in discussions 
concerning the author’s intention tend not to say enough about what they mean 
by “intention.” First, Beardsley:  
There have been complaints – some of them surely justifiable 
– about the slackness of the word “intention” in the phrase 
“the author’s intention.”41  
                                               
40 Knapp and Michaels, ‘Impossibility’, p. 55. 
41 Monroe C. Beardsley, ‘Intentions and Interpretations: A Fallacy Revived’, in The 
Aesthetic Point of View: Selected Essays (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), p. 189.  
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And Davidson:  
It seems to me that most of the discussion of this topic in literary 
theory has been philosophically crude, because so much of it has 
been cast in such terms as: Does the author’s intention matter or not? 
In order to say or write anything you have to have many intentions, 
all of them related to each other in very complicated ways. The right 
question is: Which of the author’s intentions are relevant to 
interpreting the work, or appreciating it?42  
By “author,” Beardsley means someone who desires to write a text with the 
intention “to say something in producing that text.”43 For Beardsley, the 
slackness of the word “intention” is regrettable for reasons of philosophical 
rigor and he is surely correct. However, it is Davidson who shows us a light 
beyond the debate concerning the intentional fallacy and toward a deeper 
understanding of which authorial intentions to consider in interpretation if we 
are going to make sense of the notion of interpretation at all. Davidson 
maintains that intentions are important to meaning, but they do not have the 
ultimate say on what words mean in any context. He argues that while there 
may be many kinds of intentions, at least three are always part of language use, 
spoken or written. All instances of language use involve, minimally, what 
Davidson calls intentions concerning first meaning, ulterior intentions, and 
force.44  
First, all utterances are intended to be interpreted as having specific 
meanings. Such intentions are “strictly semantic intentions.”45 That is, an 
utterer intends his or her listener or reader to understand what he or she means 
by the words he or she uses. For Davidson, these intentions concern what he 
calls “first meaning.” First meaning refers to the meanings we already grasp as 
interpreters, i.e., to the ordinary meanings of words.46 We must grasp first 
meanings if we are to understand any further meanings words have in other 
contexts. We do understand a text differently depending on whether we think it 
fact or fiction, just as we understand an utterer differently depending on 
whether we think he or she is a truth-teller. Still, prior to such judgments, we 
need to understand what the words ordinarily mean, and what words ordinarily 
mean is not up to speakers or writers.47 The intentions relevant to first meaning 
are first in the order of semantic intentions insofar as speakers and writers must 
                                               
42 Lars Bergström and Dagfinn Føllesdal, ‘Interview with Donald Davidson in November 
1993’, Theoria, vol. 60, no. 3 (1994), p. 222. 
43 Beardsley, ‘Intentions and Interpretations’, p. 190. 
44 Davidson, ‘Locating Literary Language’, pp. 289-301. 
45 Davidson, ‘Locating Literary Language’, p. 299. 
46 Davidson, ‘Locating Literary Language’, p. 301.  
47 Davidson, ‘Locating Literary Language’, pp. 289-301. 
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depend on the hearer’s or reader’s understanding of ordinary meanings of 
words even if an utterer’s use of the words is novel. 
The second kind of intentions present in language use are ulterior 
intentions. The ulterior intentions a speaker might have go beyond language to 
the purpose or goal the speaker has in mind when making an utterance. 
Language is not an end in itself. We use language as one way of satisfying our 
ulterior intentions, as we do, for example, in activities such as teaching or 
consulting with doctors about care of an ill person. We may or may not know a 
speaker’s or writer’s ulterior intentions, because one could have reasons for 
keeping them secret. Furthermore, it is unlikely that we ourselves are always 
aware of all of our own ulterior intentions.  
The third sort of intention Davidson argues is relevant to interpretation 
is that a speaker intends his or her words to be understood as having a 
particular force. The force of the utterance, if understood, contributes to 
interpreting it as ironic, an assertion, an order, etc.48 It is likely that speakers 
and writers usually understand their intended force in uttering or writing a 
sentence, but the intended force may not always be apparent to the hearer or 
reader (which increases the range of possible interpretations of any utterance).  
Davidson doubts that first meanings are what philosophers of language 
call ‘conventional meanings.’49 However, his doubts on this matter are separate 
from his point that speakers and authors intend for us to understand their words 
in terms of at least the ordinary meanings of words, however those ordinary 
meanings are established, be it by convention or not. Barthes’ does not say 
whether the “very practice of the symbol itself” is conventional practice, but in 
any event, the point remains the same: in order to interpret textual utterances at 
all, as meaningful bits of language, we must attribute to authors and speaker 
either conventional meanings, or, if we cannot give content to the notion of 
conventional meanings, as Davidson thinks, then alternatively, we must 
attribute what Davidson calls first meanings. Consequently, the author is 
always present, even if only in a minimal sense.  
Importantly, to claim that authorial intentions matter in interpretation of 
texts, or any interpretation of speech, is not to claim that the content and nature 
of our intentions as speakers or authors is transparent and fully known, even to 
ourselves, let alone to interpreters. As the following example demonstrates, 
                                               
48 I would add that the collection of words, of which the text is constituted as a whole, also 
has a force, in that the text is intended as fact or fiction or satirical or another type of text. 
49 See, for example, Donald Davidson, ‘A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs’, in Philosophical 
Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends, eds Richard Grandy and Richard 
Warner (New York: Clarendon Press, Oxford University, 1988), pp. 157-174. 
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understanding the intentions of others (and ourselves) is always incomplete.50 
In the early 1990s, artist Robert Morris did a series of drawings blindfolded, 
and beneath each drawing, he included notes that described the actions he 
made in producing the drawings and the estimated time it took. Morris also 
included quotations from Davidson’s writings on actions, events, and language. 
In separate articles both Morris and Davidson tried to explain why Morris used 
the Davidson quotations in presenting his work. Davidson could only surmise 
that perhaps in that context his quotations point us from the particularity of the 
paintings and autobiographical descriptions of the artist to the “larger 
canvass”51 concerning the general nature of action and interpretation. Davidson 
says that we know why Morris claimed to have used those quotations, by 
which he means that we know the intentions Morris says he had in using the 
writings under the paintings. What we do not know, Davidson claims, is 
whether there are any other, ulterior or hidden intentions that Morris might 
have had, because he has not told us what they might be.52 Morris writes that 
he has a stock answer about what his intentions were in creating the drawings 
and using the quotations. He started making blind drawings in 1973 because he 
was interested in what would result from “a search to find a basis for drawing 
other than straightforward representation on the one hand and the 
nonrepresentational on the other.”53 He also says that his stock answer fails to 
explain both his obsession with blind drawings and any other intentions he may 
have had. He suggests there may be darker, hidden intentions and reasons for 
doing the drawings blindfolded and using the Davidson quotes. Morris notes 
that throughout Davidson’s Essays on Actions and Events, Davidson uses 
many examples involving “dark Oedipal reason[s],”54 such as murder and 
disaster to make his points.55 Perhaps, then, the connection between 
Davidson’s texts and Morris’s own intentions is that there is something in 
Davidson’s views that speaks to Morris’s own Oedipal tendencies.56 
Ostensibly, he used Davidson’s words because he saw some relationship 
between his artwork and those words. Did he have intentions or reasons 
beyond that? Morris reminds us to invoke the principle of charity in asking 
                                               
50 See, for example, Donald Davidson, ‘Intending’, Essays on Actions and Events (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 83-102.  
51 Davidson, ‘The Third Man’, p. 615.  
52 Davidson, ‘The Third Man’, p. 614.  
53 Morris, ‘Writing with Davidson’, p. 619.  
54 Morris, ‘Writing with Davidson’, p. 620.  
55 See, for example, Donald Davidson, ‘Psychology as Philosophy’, Essays on Actions and 
Events (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 232. 
56 Morris, ‘Writing with Davidson’, p. 620.  
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why he used Davidson’s writings. However, in attributing to Morris rationality 
and a holism of beliefs, both Davidson and Morris agree we should not think 
that in so doing, we will find all of the intentions he might have. The Morris 
examples show that there may always be many more intentions we had that we 
ourselves do not see. If an author cannot identify all of his or her intentions, it 
seems unlikely the reader can. However, our inability to identify all of our own 
intentions as speakers or authors is evidence of our fallibility, not of the 
irrelevance of intentions to interpretation. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, I have proposed that we move beyond debates about the 
intentional fallacy toward a deeper understanding of how we learn about the 
intentions of authors and which intentions matter to interpretation. To that end, 
I have argued that Dickie and Wilson’s view that the “commonly thought” 
approach to the way in which we infer intentions of utterers is not significantly 
different from Hirsch’s view that we guess at the intentions of others. Thus, 
authorial intentions are available to us as a result of the probable inferences we 
make in constructing an interpretation of utterances. Furthermore, while I have 
also argued that Dickie and Wilson face the same infinite regress as Hirsch 
faces, I do not think either need to see this regress as damning to their 
accounts. Finally, I have argued in favour of exploring which kinds of authorial 
intentions are relevant in interpretation. The brief sketch of the kinds of 
intentions that are relevant to interpreting texts I have offered, through the 
discussion of Davidson and Morris, is intended to serve as a gesture I hope will 
help move debate in that direction.57 
 
 
                                               
57 I am grateful to David Bakhurst, Christine Overall, Stephen Leighton, and Francisco 
Fernflores for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. I am also grateful to my 
Literature and Aesthetics reviewers for their helpful remarks concerning this article.  
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